B-26 Marauder 320th Bomb Group

 

Tragedy on the Mountain
by Paul Schamberger

 

Home 
Editor's Message 
History 
Missions 
Photo Archive 
Film Clips 
Stories 
320th Aircraft 
Reunion Assoc. 
Memorials 
POWs 
Books/Art 
Bulletin Board 
Roster 
Remembrances 
Memorabilia 
Links 
Search 
Contact me 

 

The Swiss Veil of Silence

 

But why was the Swiss government drawing such an ominous veil of silence over the affair? Where they really so embarrassed over the deaths of three would-be évadés that they took an inordinately long time to formulate an appropriate response? If so, was there not a crying need for an impartial investigation which could clear up the matter in no time and to the satisfaction of all concerned? Why should the grieving next-of-kin in distant lands be kept in suspense about the circumstances which had led to the unexplained deaths of their menfolk?

Or – on a more sinister, but not unthinkable level – were the Swiss adopting the attitude that, whatever had happened on their soil, was nobody's business but their own?

It could not be denied that, regrettable though the deaths of three escaping servicemen somewhere in the vastness of the Swiss Alps were, the incident all but paled into insignificance compared to the horrendous death toll of tens of thousands of Allied fighting men in the hellish final drive to overcome Hitler in his bunker in Berlin. But Switzerland was neutral – what was there to hide?

  Swiss internal Army report

 

We know today that an internal army report (of sorts) was in fact compiled in connection with the deaths. Signed by the commander of the Territorial Service, Oberst (Colonel) Erich Munch and datestamped 7 February 1945, it leaned almost exclusively on the version of events as related by the frontier guards in question. They were identified only as two patrolling Füsiliere (the lowest rank in the army) of 92 Mountain Battalion. The cursory report noted that they had arrived in the area only four days previously, and were unfamiliar with the terrain. In addition, the foul weather, a dark night, "utterly exhausted" refugees, misunderstandings between all parties due to language difficulties – these and other adverse factors, taken together, were to blame for the deaths of the three men, whose names and nationalities were correctly stated. The bodies had been found far off the path ("weitab vom Wege"), where they would most probably not have been found at night. As for the Füsiliere, they had acted conscientiously ("nach bestem Wissen and Gewissen"), and were specifically absolved from any blame.[7]

Did it, or did it not strike the credulous – or conniving – Oberst M
ünch that his two paragons of virtue might have been lying? We shall never know. Before long the curtain opened on a tenacious diplomatic chess game The players: British legation v. Switzerland Inc.


  Clifford Norton, British legation chief, makes the first move

 

 


 

Clifford Norton
 

Nothing stirred until legation chief Clifford Norton reached out to make the first move. On 9 February – three weeks after the deaths – he wrote to the Swiss Political Department (Foreign Affairs), urging that the relevant authorities might bestir themselves.[8] To make sure the Swiss understood the seriousness with which the British mission viewed the incident, Norton enclosed the several statements and declarations in the envelope, and had it delivered.


W. Stucki responds on behalf of the Swiss

 

On 16 February, accompanied by a brief covering note signed by W. Stucki of the Foreign Affairs Department the long-awaited report arrived. It was typewritten not on a letterhead, but on a sheet of white paper, sans heading, and sans signature. There was nothing at all to indicate it provenance. A document identifier, =EF, was typed in the top left-hand corner. The abbreviated date, 16.2.45 appeared at the end. The opening line indicated that this was the "upshot of the inquest" into the deaths of the three Allied men. Its very appearance gave it an air of the most casual informality – enough, no doubt, to make Brig. Cartwright's hackles rise.

The report began by saying that on the day it question, two soldiers of the 92nd Mountain Battalion had arrived in that area only four days previously. While they were on patrol they arrested "a dozen" refugees after 1600 hours. Then:

As they did not know the district well, they [the Swiss soldiers] decided, instead of taking the short cut towards Brissago (as the foreign soldiers whom they had just arrested, wanted them to), to climb the other way towards the pasture of Arolgia, in order to regain, from there, a track which they knew to Cortaggio.

As the refugees were tired out, this climb through thick snow took some considerable time. The two soldiers helped as much as they could, lending them their gloves, and supporting the weakest ones. One of them decided to look for help. Alone, his comrade was overtaken by nightfall and heavy snow flurries, and he was unable to keep check on the number of refugees who followed on, or what state they were in. When they finally reached the Arolgia Alp towards 1900 hours, he made them go into a chalet.

The refugees asked for a hot drink. The soldier gave them to understand that they would only be able to obtain one at Cortaggio. The refugees then declared they were too exhausted to go on any further.

The soldier, being under the impression that some of the refugees had not arrived, went off in search for them, but he soon realised that in that snowstorm and at night, a search would be in vain. He therefore decided to go and look for his comrade and the help which the latter should have brought.

This latter [soldier] had, in fact, already reached Cortaggio, and had returned on the road towards the Arolgia Alp with two of his comrades, unfortunately without notifying the frontier guard on duty.

Meanwhile, the soldier who was descending down the Arolgia Alp, had lost his way and began to call his comrades coming up from Cortaggio. This group of soldiers lost precious time in finding their way back in this particularly difficult country at night and in the snow, and they came to the conclusion that in order to climb the Arolgia Alp again they would need to be guided by a frontier guard. They therefore came down again to Cortaggio and went to the frontier guard. This was after 2000 hours. The soldiers only spoke German, and the guard, Italian. The latter was not aware of the true situation of the escaped prisoners and only understood that they were sheltering in a chalet which he knew [was] supplied with wood for a fire.

Although in the meantime, he had been notified by the Brissago post of the presence of refugees on the mountain and the risk they ran of dying from exposure, he understood from the soldier's explanation that the refugees were under shelter, and thought it reasonable to wait until the morning before setting off.

It was only the next day that a patrol climbed towards the Arolgia Alp, meeting the refugees on the way who, constrained by hunger, had attempted a descent, and had found on their way the bodies of their own comrades. The patrol then split up into two, one party accompanying the refugees to Brissago, whilst the other took charge of the corpses of those who had succumbed.

According to the doctor's statement, death in the three cases was one in the first instance, [due] to exhaustion.

The salient points which played a part in this tragic accident may therefore be summed up as follows:

1. The decision of the two soldiers of the 92nd Battalion to reclimb the Arolgia Alp instead of descending towards Brissago with the refugees by the short cut which had been pointed out to them by their Italian guides, was reasonable as the short cut was unknown to the two Swiss soldiers. They cannot be blamed for their decision therefore, especially as they could hardly understand what the refugees were trying to tell them.

2. The premature departure of one of the two soldiers to look for help. It is possible that if both the soldiers had, on the contrary, taken the head and tail respectively of the column of refugees, they would finally have been able to reach the chalet at Arolgia with the column complete, although there is nothing to prove that the victims (of the accident) could have overcome their state of utter exhaustion. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the two soldiers tried to do their best to help their foreign comrades.

3. The decision of the second soldier to go off in search of the first and that of the frontier guard at Cortaggio to postpone until the next day the climb to the Arolgia Alp, do not seem to have been determining factors. The bodies of the victims were found very far from the road and it is very unlikely that a search undertaken at night, would have enabled them to find the men in time to save them.[9]

(Continued)


Topical Articles Index Page


Copyright(c) 2006 320th Reunion Association. All rights reserved.