Swiss border guards intentions are questionable and ulterior motive hypothesized

First, the two fumbling Füsiliere of 92 Bat. Although there is not a shred of proof in any document, it is possible, even probable, that the two shadowy figures in Swiss army greatcoats and wielding army rifles were Nazi/fascist sympathizers.

From the moment they spotted them, they would have suspected the newcomers were runaway Allied escaped prisoners of war. Their identification as such was quickly established. Indeed, that they were britische Soldaten and other Allied personnel was repeatedly shouted into their unneutral ears by the wholly unsuspecting Welsh. The last thing on their minds was, to follow orders and escort the new arrivals to Cortaggio where the English-speaking corporal in charge would most likely have welcomed them to Switzerland. But if they were mere "Wops", they could risk turning them out with impunity (at that time Switzerland was bulging with 22,000 Italian war refugees). And if problems arose, they could count on all like-minded Swiss soldiers to look the other way – including the Cortaggio corporal. The charade worked like a charm.

Tea is a clue. Tea was offered to the obstinate English-speaking Hoyne as a bribe to make him go voluntarily into the "chalet" (read: hut) and stay there. It was not for nothing that, when the tea instead reached the =EF official's desk on 16 February, a quick sleight of hand turned it into a nondescript "hot drink". Such were the pains that were taken to avoid hinting, let alone mention, that the foreign refugees were English speakers.

Forging on, we might as well place the remaining pieces into position.

1. It did not take the soldiers long to realize their malevolent plan of expelling their captives could not be accomplished before darkness enveloped the valley (thus jeopardizing their return walk from the ridge at the top). So they diverted the ten tired, shivering, hungry and thirsty men to their "barracks". This turned out to be one of the empty huts on the nearby Arolgia meadow. (Welsh's very steep path was one which the group had obviously not used going down.)

2. What already counted against them were (a) ten wrongful arrests, (b) disobeying explicit army orders regarding refugees, and (c) gross negligence concerning three weaker or ailing refugees who should have been assisted not up but down the mountain along the shortest route to the nearest source of help.

3. They dumped what was left of the slow-moving refugee group some distance from the selected hut, and ordered them to go inside. Taking no chances with the missing men who might yet recover and escape, they set out to find them. They would bundle them into the hut along with the others. Then they could wash their hands of the lot and skedaddle downhill to their real barracks.

4. It is highly likely that the Füsiliere believed (or hoped) that the apparently collapsing foreigners – all potential witnesses of their despicable conduct – would not last the night on the lonely, snow-bound meadow, in a mere hut, with no food, in sub-zero temperatures and far away from human help or habitation. Anyone arriving on the scene next day or even later would find several dead, frozen bodies. Even if they were somehow implicated, the Füsiliere could always claim they "had tried to do their best to help their foreign comrades" – words which were to surface, unerringly, in the =EF report.

5. Instead of finding the troublesome trio whose delays had put paid to the exit march, they found their corpses. The Italian-speaking man who had assisted them earlier was gone (they also missed one Russian who was by now well on his way downhill). The afternoon's shenanigan to kick out "a dozen" unwanted foreigners turned into a real crisis. A possible disciplinary hearing into their misdemeanours was now the least of their worries. What loomed ahead was a court-martial with three charges of culpable homicide short of murder.

6. Knowing that dead men tell no tales, the Füsiliere dragged the bodies much further away from the places where they had found them. It would then appear that three refugees had foolishly strayed from the "road" (read: path), making it, alas, impossible for any night searchers to have found them in time to save their lives. The snowfall would obliterate any incriminating signs. Not surprisingly, the bodies were, found next day where they were supposed to be found: far off the path. Point 3 of the =EF report squared seamlessly with faith­fully reported facts.

7. Stripping off their military gloves, they thoughtfully slipped them on the cold hands of two corpses. Even that small detail –no doubt noticed and reported by the recovery team next day. – would find its way into the =EF document (... lending them their gloves...). More "proof" that the twosome had "done their best".

8. The two soldiers indeed departed. But not to seek help. One returned to the Hoyne group which was still outside the hut. (They were clearly waiting for the two armed menaces to tire of their cat and mouse game and clear off, before resuming their downhill trek.) Speaking to Hoyne, the man in charge (no Swiss could speak Russian), the soldier persuaded him and the Russians to move inside –but only after hoodwinking him into believing that tea and food would be brought up.

9. The other accomplice hastened to the Cortaggio post where he reported to the sentry on duty (presumably the corporal of Welsh's later acquaintance) that although some wretched Italian refugees were on the mountain, there was no need to worry – all were well, and safe and snug inside a chalet supplied with firewood.

10. For their deception to succeed it was necessary (a) that the refugees stayed where they were; (b) that the corporal did not venture out prematurely to look them up (it was a safe bet that he would hardly worry about "Wop" refugees inside a chalet, who were no doubt warming themselves in front of a cosy fire).

11. Instead of freezing to death, six much recovered ghosts emerged from their flimsy shelter half an hour before noon next day and drifted downhill. Rfm. John Welsh erred in asserting that "We passed the bodies of McGowan, Lundgren and Clarke at the places where I had left them the night before." Unencumbered by invalids, hurrying to get to the safety of the Swiss town, and with a landscape that looked very different in broad daylight, he evidently did not notice the significantly altered positions of the corpses if, indeed, he saw McGowan's body at all.

12. The Füsiliere were unaware that the commotion at the time of the arrests had been loud enough to attract the attention of an unseen witness. Even if Pte. Frost, lower down but still within earshot, had not actually seen what was causing the shouting, he certainly heard it and drew his own conclusions.

13. As the pro-Allied Italian partisans and the three guides knew (no doubt from their ass­ociates, the contraband runners): once the awkward ridge on the Italian side had been conquered, the way down to the Swiss lakeside town was not too difficult, even for novices. The safe arrival in Brissago of the Rowe and Frost groups was sufficient proof of that. Moreover, a successful one-man descent at night and in app­arently foul weather was under­taken by the Russian whom Welsh had encountered with McGowan. (This last inference is based on the fact that no more deaths – apart from the three known ones – were reported.)

14. Finally, if there were language difficulties, they existed solely between the Swiss soldiers and the Russians. But since the latter at all times remained close to their English-speaking friends, the "difficulty" was made up.

To fit in a further detail: Rfm. Welsh's assumption that the Swiss corporal's (belated) presence next morning was thanks to a report made by his companions – which included his own brother – was correct. They did so the minute they walked into Brissago some time before 1800 hours. But the town's army post, evidently after waiting some time for the stragglers to show up, telephoned their man at Cortaggio much later to alert him that people were on the mountain and could freeze to death. The reason for his non-action has been explained. The extent of his complicity is another matter. Was the line so indistinct that the words "British refugee soldiers" came out as “…wretched Italian/Wop refugees, so don't bother"? We shall never know.

USAAF Sgt. Leonard Hoyne – the luckiest survivor of "Baby Shoes" – left Switzerland on 10 February. He went to Annecy in France, and reached his home in the USA on 10 April.[17] The Dominion men left in early March, first to Britain, then to their respective countries.

  Strained Swiss-Anglo/American Relations

Perhaps the deaths should be viewed in the context of a particularly fraught phase in Swiss-Anglo/American relations which characterized the first months of 1945. The minds of top-ranking Swiss, particularly at Foreign Affairs, were fully occupied.

On 15 January the US State Department, intent on breaking up what was perceived to be Switzerland's far too close and complaisant banking, financial, industrial and trade links with Nazi Germany, tossed a tough package of demands into the neutral government's lap. The measures were designed to cut completely, or at least reduce significantly, all Swiss-German ties, contracts or arrangements that were deemed unacceptable or repugnant to the soon-to-be victors in the all-out war against Hitler.

To ensure the Swiss got the message, the American president dispatched a hectoring mission, headed by Laughlin Currie, to Berne. It arrived by train on 11 Feb­ruary. After three weeks of arm-twisting at the negotiation table, the American-led delegation triumphed when they got their counterparts to sign, on, 8 March, the historic Currie Agreement.

Throughout the turbulent war years the Swiss had clung tenaciously to their state maxims of absolute neutrality and sovereignty. Now they were ignominiously "rewarded" with the punitive Currie Diktat. What additional steps (they might have feared) would be in store if the awkward truth about the circumstances surrounding the "Gridone" deaths became known? No less than six Allied governments were ranged against them: the much-feared United States; Britain and her associated governments of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand; and that ominous new player in Europe, the Soviet Union. Even the new Italian socialist government might look askance at some prevailing attitudes in la Svizzera. It would have been an inauspicious first step into a fundamentally realigned post-war world – one from which Switzerland was determined not be excluded.

Perhaps we should pause to contemplate what the most likely verdict of an impartial hearing – which Brig. Cartwright had expected – might have been. Possibly, that the irresponsible chicanery of two or three xenophobic greenhorns had led to the deaths of three escaped prisoners of war – but only indirectly, as extenuating circumstances were present. After all, McGowan and Lundgren were weak because they had not eaten any rice, and Clarke was weak because he may already have been ill.

Had the Swiss authorities summoned the courage to conduct an open, impartial inquiry, the matter could have been cleared up – and without any lasting damage to Switzerland's reputation. As the UK's experienced military representative in Berne might have intimated to the angst-ridden confederates: "It is not your neutrality which is being weighed and found wanting, but merely the criminal conduct of two or three rotten apples within the ranks of 92 Mountain Battalion." History must record that, whatever their motives, the top echelon of the Swiss government was unable to recognize the difference.

Another irony is that the Füsiliere's excessive anglophobia was groundless. With the western border open in 1945 no évadé would have been permitted to remain on neutral soil longer than necessary.

  Lt. Hoynes's account scant and devoid of facts

But if a trial was never on the agenda – would not the world sit up and take notice if the surviving American "Gridone" man spoke up and told the truth? Alas, no. Bomber gunner Leonard Hoyne seemed to suffer from instant post-war amnesia. Shortly after returning home, Hoyne, whose assistance was required in a routine USAAF inquiry into the loss of "Baby Shoes", wrote on the air force's casualty questionnaire in black on white that:

Italian Alps? Italy? Brig. Cartwright might have thrown an apoplectic fit at such American small-town naiviety. But Uncle Sam, with only a broken reed to lean on, would have needed more than an Alpenstock had he wished to prod the Swiss into disclosing the truth about the Mt. Gridone deaths.

We should note that it was not the erring Hoyne, but a caring South African who was "with them" when the two Americans perished in the neutral snow of Switzerland. (Continued)