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But
why was the Swiss government drawing such an ominous
veil of silence over the affair? Where they really so
embarrassed over the deaths of three would-be évadés
that they took an inordinately long time to formulate
an appropriate response? If so, was there not a crying
need for an impartial investigation which could clear
up the matter in no time and to the satisfaction of
all concerned? Why should the grieving next-of-kin in
distant lands be kept in suspense about the circumstances
which had led to the unexplained deaths of their menfolk?
Or
– on a more sinister, but not unthinkable level – were
the Swiss adopting the attitude that, whatever had happened
on their soil, was nobody's business but their own?
It
could not be denied that, regrettable though the deaths
of three escaping servicemen somewhere in the vastness
of the Swiss Alps were, the incident all but paled into
insignificance compared to the horrendous death toll
of tens of thousands of Allied fighting men in the hellish
final drive to overcome Hitler in his bunker in Berlin.
But Switzerland was neutral – what was there to hide?
Swiss internal Army report
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We
know today that an internal army report
(of sorts) was in fact compiled in connection
with the deaths. Signed by the commander
of the Territorial Service, Oberst (Colonel)
Erich Munch and datestamped 7 February 1945,
it leaned almost exclusively on the version
of events as related by the frontier guards
in question. They were identified only as
two patrolling Füsiliere (the lowest rank
in the army) of 92 Mountain Battalion. The
cursory report noted that they had arrived
in the area only four days previously, and
were unfamiliar with the terrain. In addition,
the foul weather, a dark night, "utterly
exhausted" refugees, misunderstandings
between all parties due to language difficulties
– these and other adverse factors, taken
together, were to blame for the deaths of
the three men, whose names and nationalities
were correctly stated. The bodies had been
found far off the path ("weitab vom
Wege"), where they would most probably
not have been found at night. As for the
Füsiliere, they had acted conscientiously
("nach bestem Wissen and Gewissen"),
and were specifically absolved from any
blame.[7]
Did it, or did it not strike
the credulous – or conniving – Oberst Münch
that his two paragons of virtue might have
been lying? We shall never know. Before
long the curtain opened on a tenacious diplomatic
chess game The players: British legation
v. Switzerland Inc.
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Clifford Norton, British legation chief,
makes the first move
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Clifford
Norton
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Nothing stirred until legation chief Clifford Norton reached
out to make the first move. On 9 February – three weeks after the deaths – he
wrote to the Swiss Political Department (Foreign Affairs), urging that the
relevant authorities might bestir themselves.[8] To make sure the
Swiss understood the seriousness with which the British mission viewed the
incident, Norton enclosed the several statements and declarations in the
envelope, and had it delivered.
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W. Stucki responds on behalf of the Swiss
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On
16 February, accompanied by a brief covering
note signed by W. Stucki of the Foreign
Affairs Department the long-awaited report
arrived. It was typewritten not on a letterhead,
but on a sheet of white paper, sans heading,
and sans signature. There was nothing at
all to indicate it provenance. A document
identifier, =EF, was typed in the top left-hand
corner. The abbreviated date, 16.2.45 appeared
at the end. The opening line indicated that
this was the "upshot of the inquest"
into the deaths of the three Allied men.
Its very appearance gave it an air of the
most casual informality – enough, no doubt,
to make Brig. Cartwright's hackles rise.
The
report began by saying that on the day it
question, two soldiers of the 92nd Mountain
Battalion had arrived in that area only
four days previously. While they were on
patrol they arrested "a dozen"
refugees after 1600 hours. Then:
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As
they did not know the district
well, they [the Swiss soldiers]
decided, instead of taking the
short cut towards Brissago (as
the foreign soldiers whom they
had just arrested, wanted them
to), to climb the other way
towards the pasture of Arolgia,
in order to regain, from there,
a track which they knew to Cortaggio.
As
the refugees were tired out,
this climb through thick snow
took some considerable time.
The two soldiers helped as much
as they could, lending them
their gloves, and supporting
the weakest ones. One of them
decided to look for help. Alone,
his comrade was overtaken by
nightfall and heavy snow flurries,
and he was unable to keep check
on the number of refugees who
followed on, or what state they
were in. When they finally reached
the Arolgia Alp towards 1900
hours, he made them go into
a chalet.
The refugees
asked for a hot drink. The soldier
gave them to understand that
they would only be able to obtain
one at Cortaggio. The refugees
then declared they were too
exhausted to go on any further.
The
soldier, being under the impression
that some of the refugees had
not arrived, went off in search
for them, but he soon realised
that in that snowstorm and at
night, a search would be in
vain. He therefore decided to
go and look for his comrade
and the help which the latter
should have brought.
This
latter [soldier] had, in fact,
already reached Cortaggio, and
had returned on the road towards
the Arolgia Alp with two of
his comrades, unfortunately
without notifying the frontier
guard on duty.
Meanwhile,
the soldier who was descending
down the Arolgia Alp, had lost
his way and began to call his
comrades coming up from Cortaggio.
This group of soldiers lost
precious time in finding their
way back in this particularly
difficult country at night and
in the snow, and they came to
the conclusion that in order
to climb the Arolgia Alp again
they would need to be guided
by a frontier guard. They therefore
came down again to Cortaggio
and went to the frontier guard.
This was after 2000 hours. The
soldiers only spoke German,
and the guard, Italian. The
latter was not aware of the
true situation of the escaped
prisoners and only understood
that they were sheltering in
a chalet which he knew [was]
supplied with wood for a fire.
Although
in the meantime, he had been
notified by the Brissago post
of the presence of refugees
on the mountain and the risk
they ran of dying from exposure,
he understood from the soldier's
explanation that the refugees
were under shelter, and thought
it reasonable to wait until
the morning before setting off.
It
was only the next day that a
patrol climbed towards the Arolgia
Alp, meeting the refugees on
the way who, constrained by
hunger, had attempted a descent,
and had found on their way the
bodies of their own comrades.
The patrol then split up into
two, one party accompanying
the refugees to Brissago, whilst
the other took charge of the
corpses of those who had succumbed.
According
to the doctor's statement, death
in the three cases was one in
the first instance, [due] to
exhaustion.
The salient
points which played a part in
this tragic accident may therefore
be summed up as follows:
1.
The decision of the two soldiers
of the 92nd Battalion to reclimb
the Arolgia Alp instead of descending
towards Brissago with the refugees
by the short cut which had been
pointed out to them by their
Italian guides, was reasonable
as the short cut was unknown
to the two Swiss soldiers. They
cannot be blamed for their decision
therefore, especially as they
could hardly understand what
the refugees were trying to
tell them.
2. The premature
departure of one of the two
soldiers to look for help. It
is possible that if both the
soldiers had, on the contrary,
taken the head and tail respectively
of the column of refugees, they
would finally have been able
to reach the chalet at Arolgia
with the column complete, although
there is nothing to prove that
the victims (of the accident)
could have overcome their state
of utter exhaustion. On the
other hand, there is no doubt
that the two soldiers tried
to do their best to help their
foreign comrades.
3.
The decision of the second soldier
to go off in search of the first
and that of the frontier guard
at Cortaggio to postpone until
the next day the climb to the
Arolgia Alp, do not seem to
have been determining factors.
The bodies of the victims were
found very far from the road
and it is very unlikely that
a search undertaken at night,
would have enabled them to find
the men in time to save them.[9]
(Continued)
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The Swiss Veil of Silence