The Allied depositions give a differing view of the tragedy

Brig. Cartwright may have been flabbergasted, but he was not fooled. In the light of what he knew from his witnesses, and from the sole American survivor via his colleague, the US military attaché, there was little doubt in his mind that the belated, one-sided and almost flippant Swiss report, produced by some anonymous official in the Foreign Affairs Department, was superficial, specious and reeked of a cover-up. He might have guessed, too, that the =EF document was based on an underlying investigative army report which was evidently far too compromising to be shown to the legation. Hence the new ad hoc, "sanitized" version which, the Swiss must have hoped, would satisfy the upset diplomats in the Thunstrasse.

Another indignant cipher chased through the wires to London. Cartwright commented extensively and critically on the =EF report and its findings (the report itself was, also cabled to London). He singled out the two Swiss soldiers' "muddling" and – especially – the fact that they were not blamed for the outcome. Had they not interfered, all the Allied men would have reached safety.

He pointed out that the soldier who had reached the frontier guard's post at Cortaggio was aware that not all the men were in the hut, but had failed to mention this vital fact. Since the frontier guard was under the impression that all the men were under shelter, he took no steps until the next day. The military attaché did not mince words:

As far as the alleged language difficulty was con­cerned: "No common language could have been necessary to the understanding of the facts that the refugees wished to continue downhill and that some of the men were too exhausted to go uphill," the exasperated attaché noted.

Neither was there anything to show that those men who were indeed extremely exhausted could not have overcome their exhaustion. With the help of their stronger comrades they could in fact have made it down to Brissago.

What probably angered Cartwright most was that no attempt had been made to interrogate or question the Allied survivors. It was incomprehensible to him that particularly the Italian-speaking South African, Rfrn. J.F. Welsh – who had witnessed the drama from beginning to end – had not been contacted.

He must have found it particularly frustrating that the normally conscientious Swiss had deliberately ignored the seven affidavits which Norton had sent them. And why the casual reference to "a dozen" refugees when it was perfectly clear there had been ten of them?

In summary, there had not been an impartial inquiry "by an official hearing both sides of the story, and no Swiss soldier or frontier guard appears to have been charged with the neglect which resulted in the deaths of these men." Brig. Cartwright reiterated that there was a strong case of criminal negligence against at least the soldier who acquiesced in the failure of the frontier guard to take action.10

Not only Rfm. J.F. Welsh's three-page deposition, but even Pte. W. Frost's shorter version held important clues which ought to have assisted the Swiss examiners in clarifying what to Brig. Cartwright was self-evident. Frost had said:

  The British and American legation conclude that due care had not been provided by the Swiss Soldiers

On 5 April Norton and his American counterpart, the US legation head Leland Harrison, sent parallel diplomatic notes to the Swiss Foreign Affairs Department. Norton wrote to Max Petitpierre, who had only recently taken over the Foreign Affairs portfolio from Marcel Pilet­Golaz: "I have carefully considered this report with the Military Attaché of this Legation and have come to the conclusion that had due care been taken by the Swiss soldiers belonging to the 92nd mountain battalion, the lives of the Allied soldiers might have been saved." [12] (Continued)